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Abstract:
This Article will show that the term “extraordinary rendition” is of short legal history
and that its conception perverts a number of basic international law principles. In
doing so, it will be shown that this process is a method counter-productive to long
terms goals in the War on Terrorism… We can conclude therefore that both
“rendition to justice” and “extraordinary rendition” bear little resemblance to the
traditional use of the terms rendition or extradition - the recognised, legal methods of
transferring a suspect of a criminal offence from one State to another… the
protections of an extradition Treaty and the rights it affords an accused can be seen as
inherent justiciable. The use of the extradition process is an expression of State
sovereignty, yet the guiding principles of double criminality and specialty ensure that
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the rights of the transferred person are also subject to protection and judicial scrutiny.
…It is clear that the nature of enforced disappearances is such as to attempt to avoid
any legal process and human rights protection. In addition, it is noted that official
denial of this practise as part of counter-terrorist policy and a lack of judicial
oversight contribute to the view that U.S. intelligence agencies are aware of the
illegality of the practise at international law

Text:

An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to stretch, to
misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws. He that would make his own
liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty
he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself. - Thomas Paine1

1. Introduction

Since the declaration of the War on Terrorism2, a number of U.S. counter-terrorism
practises emerged that have provoked criticism and concern from foreign
governments3, non-governmental organisations4, and legal scholars5. We begin by
1

Dissertation on First Principles of Government (Paris, July 1795)

2

Office of the Press Secretary, “President Declares Freedom at War with Fear”

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (last visited Aug. 26, 06)
3

See inter alia Merkel Critical of US Terror Tactics Ahead of Washington Visit; http://www.dw-

world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1849687,00.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
4

Human Rights Watch, Torture – Renditions Campaigns

http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/torture/renditions.htm (last visited Aug 26, 2006)
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recognising that such practises emerged under the shadow of a constant terrorist
threat. By invoking a wartime mentality, the reality of the immediate and consistent
terrorist threat is given prominence in U.S. political and intelligence circles. The focus
of counter-terrorist activity requires intelligence and police forces to prevent and deter
future terrorist attacks, in addition to responding to those already perpetrated.6 Their
commendable and essential efforts continue to thwart attempted acts of terrorism
globally and, in particular, on both sides of the Atlantic.

The United Kingdom remains a close ally of the United States in the War on
Terrorism, and has, as a result, been the subject of recent attempted attacks on its own
soil. Faced with a common global threat, the need for a common and global solution
arises. This Article acknowledges that the terrorist threat faced by the United States
and its allies is unlike those that have come before. The tactics of suicide bombing
and chemical warfare are unlike the relatively conventional methods employed in the
twentieth century by the organisations such as the I.R.A. and E.TA. Faced with
twenty first century terrorism, a twenty first century solution is required.

The present approach, including extended detention at Guantanamo Bay, has
recognised the hybrid nature of the War on Terrorism. By its nature the fight against
terrorism is not a conventional war, yet it can be argued that the gravity and nature of
terrorist acts require specialist legislation and treaty law for effective prevention and
punishment beyond ordinary existing criminal law. As part of the counter-terrorist

5

David Weissbrodt and Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis 19

Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 123 (2006)
6

See William J. Stuntz Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale Law Journal 2137 (2002)
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response of the United States, it has emerged that indicated that U.S. intelligence
agencies, in particular the C.I.A., have forcibly removed suspected terrorists from
foreign jurisdictions and transported them to other States, for the purposes of
interrogation, and to the United States to stand trial. Evidence further suggests that
intelligence agencies transfer such suspects to States where it is probable that torture
will be used as part of such interrogations.7 It appears that this practise has occurred
without the knowledge of the State from which the individual was taken. This transfer
process, including the possibility of torture as part of interrogation, has been termed
“extraordinary rendition” in both popular media8 and legal scholarship.9

In 2006, Amnesty International10, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe11,
and Senator Dick Marty of the Council of Europe12 released separate reports detailing

7

The Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York

and The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, “Torture
by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions” (Torture by
Proxy) available at www.nyuhr.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
8

See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The secret history of America’s ‘extraordinary rendition’

program, in The New Yorker, 14 & 21 February 2005
9

See Weissbrodt and Bergquist supra

10

Amnesty International U.S.A., “Below the Radar: Secret flights to torture and “disappearance”

(Below the Radar), AI Index: AMR 51/051/2006 available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510512006?open&of=ENG-313 (last visited Aug. 26,
06)
11

Venice Commission, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member

States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners adopted by the
Venice Commission at its 66th Plenary Session (Venice), 17-18 March 2006, available at
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)009-e.asp (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
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evidence of the “extraordinary rendition” process and outlining the international legal
obligations of the United States for its alleged practise and Council of Europe
Member States for the possible use of their territory to transport suspected terrorists.
It is beyond the scope of this article to contest the factual information presented in
such reports. This Article will therefore be confined to discuss of the international
legal impact of the “extraordinary rendition” process. This Article will show that the
term “extraordinary rendition” is of short legal history and that its conception perverts
a number of basic international law principles. In doing so, it will be shown that this
process is a method counter-productive to long terms goals in the War on Terrorism
as it damages inter-State relations and fails to facilitate a co-operative attitude
necessary to prevent a global threat.

This Article will first examine the legality of “extraordinary rendition”. It will be
shown that the use of “extraordinary rendition” as a legal term and international
criminal offence is a misnomer. The practise will be shown to consist of two, preexisting international offences: abductions and enforced disappearances. It will be
12

Report by the Secretary General on the use of his powers under Article 52 of the European

Convention on Human Rights in the light of reports suggesting that individuals, notably persons
suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism, may have been arrested and detained, or transported
while deprived of their liberty, by or at the instigation of foreign agencies, with the active or passive
co-operation of States Parties to the Convention or by States Parties themselves at their own initiative,
without such deprivation of liberty having been acknowledged; (Marty Report) SG/Inf (2006) 5 28
February 2006, available at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=SG/Inf(2006)5&Sector=secPrivateOffice&Language=lanEnglish
&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFA
C75 (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
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shown that the domestic U.S. use of these terms facilitates an unwelcome ambiguity
in the extent of the power of the U.S. intelligence services. In addition, this Article
will show that, in an international context, the creation of a new international crime of
“extraordinary rendition” is unnecessary and unhelpful, as this would blur clear, preexisting international legal boundaries and would damage global co-operation in
counter-terrorism.

Second, this Article examines the recognised international offences of abduction and
enforced disappearance and shows that both acts are prohibited under conventional
and customary international law. This Article shows that when an individual is
brought before a court by way of abduction, the appropriate response of that court is
to deny itself jurisdiction to hear the case. In the case of enforced disappearances, it
will be shown this hybrid offence violates a multitude of human rights and that all
States are under positive obligation to investigate and deter the offence. In conclusion,
we examine the appropriateness of “extraordinary rendition” as a counter-terrorism
measure in the broader context of the War on Terrorism.

2.

Defining “Extraordinary Rendition”: An Unnecessary Exercise

The United States officially denies the existence of an “extraordinary rendition”
program. Details of the “extraordinary rendition” process have come to light primarily
through journalistic and non-governmental investigation. In the absence of official
confirmation, academics13 and non-governmental organisations14 have variously
13

See Torture by Proxy supra
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defined the term “extraordinary rendition.” It is noted that some discrepancy exists
among such definitions, in addition to a further difference in the popular use of the
term15. This ambiguity has lead commentators to describe the term as
“euphemistic”16. The official denial and covert nature of the practise also contributes
to a lack of coherence and clarity.

As a preliminary issue, it will be necessary to examine the use of the terms
“rendition” and “extraordinary rendition” as they occur in U.S. intelligence and
military circles. The United States have acknowledged the existence of a practise of
“rendition to justice”, whereby suspected terrorists are forcibly taken to the United
States for the purposes of facing trial. The process appears to have been initiated
under the Reagan Administration17 and continued under the Clinton Administration.
Presidential Decision Directive 39 states:

If we do not receive adequate cooperation from a state that harbors a
terrorist whose extradition we are seeking, we shall take appropriate
measures to induce cooperation. Return of suspects by force may be effected
without the cooperation of the host government, consistent with the

14

Below the Radar, Section 1.1 Renditions

15

In particular, the terms “rendition” and “extraordinary rendition” have been used loosely and in some

instances interchangeably.
16

Herbert, It’s Called Torture 28-02-05 Spiegel Online

http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,344019,00.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
17

Torture by Proxy, at 15
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procedures outlined in NSD-77, which shall remain in effect.18

The differences between “renditions to justice” and “extraordinary rendition” must be
emphasised. We should remember that “Extraordinary rendition” is a process not
officially by the United States government. It appears that while “renditions to
justice” result in a trial in due course of law, it is suggested that “extraordinary
renditions” appear to be primarily for the purposes of interrogation, and carry a risk of
torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.19 It is unclear whether either
foreign governments or U.S. security agents carry out such interrogations. The
existence of further and alternative purposes of the detentions is also unclear. It
appears that detention in this context has also been used in a preventative fashion. The
term “extraordinary rendition” has been used exclusively in the context of counterterrorism, and it is argued that the term is insufficiently distinct from “renditions to
justice” and the traditional terms relating to the international transfer of an individual
to facilitate conceptual clarity.20 It is suggested that the ambiguity in this area of the
law has allowed intelligence agencies considerable discretion and freedom to act in
the international sphere without recognisable powers or clearly defined limits to such
powers.

To attempt to clarify the legal nature of the process, it is proposed to examine the preexisting legal concepts and terms relevant to the transfer of an individual suspect from

18

Presidential Decision Directive 39 U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism; available at

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
19

Torture by Proxy, at 13

20

Id.
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one State to another. We will conclude that the term “extraordinary rendition” is an
inappropriate description of the process.

Rendition can be defined as “the return of a fugitive from one State to the State where
the fugitive is accused or convicted of a crime.”21 This definition can be seen to
describe the core process involved in all relevant forms of inter-State transfer,
including extradition and abduction. An example of the traditional use of the term
“rendition” is the transfer of individuals between territories of the British
Commonwealth.22 The Commonwealth Scheme for the Rendition of Fugitive
Offenders, 1966 as amended 199023 governs the transfer of accused persons between
States of the British Commonwealth. This scheme is not a formal Treaty, but an
informal arrangement between Commonwealth States, relying upon the comity of
nations.24 Nonetheless it is possible, first, to recognise the correct legal use of the term
“rendition” and, second, to emphasise reciprocal obligations and co-operation
between States as the basis of the procedure.

Extradition can be defined as “the official surrender of an alleged criminal by one
state or nation (“the host State”) to another (“the forum State”) having jurisdiction

21

Black’s Law Dictionary 1298 (7th ed. 1999)

22

See Patrick L. Robinson, The Commonwealth Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive

Offenders: A Critical Appraisal of Some Essential Elements (1983) 33 ICLQ 614
23

The Commonwealth Scheme for the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders, 1966 as amended 1990

available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7B717FA6D4-0DDF4D10-853E-D250F3AE65D0%7D_London_Amendments.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
24

Robinson criticises the scheme (as amended) in this regard, citing the lack of reciprocal obligations

in the absence of a treaty. See Robinson, supra, at 617 – 624.
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over the crime charged.”25 Extradition is governed through bi-lateral Treaty
agreement and is subject to the two general principles of specialty and double
criminality. It can be seen that rendition and extradition are similar and related
processes. Both are governed by a form of Treaty or legislation26 and occur with the
consent and knowledge of both State parties to the transfer. While one can
acknowledge some similarity to the “rendition to justice” and “extraordinary
rendition” processes detailed in the introduction, a number of key differences must
now be outlined.

First, both processes appear to have taken place on the territory of foreign States
without the consent or knowledge of the affected States. This itself constitutes a
breach of international law, as it both violates the sovereign equality of States27 and
can be seen as interference in the internal affairs of that State.28 It is also evident no
formal bilateral or multilateral agreement governs either process. It can therefore be
seen to constitute a unilateral action, involving the use of force in foreign
jurisdictions. It will be shown that both the “rendition to justice” process and the
inter-State aspect of “extraordinary renditions” can be accommodated within the preexisting offence of abduction. This offence gives rise to State responsibility, creates
human rights obligations and disrupts the public world order. This Article concludes
that both practises are an inappropriate response to terrorism as a result of these
issues. The unilateral nature of the processes and fundamental violations of
25

26

Black’s Law Dictionary 605 (7th ed 1999)
In the case of the British Commonwealth, extradition is based in the Extradition Act 2003; rendition

can be found in the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967
27

U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 1.

28

U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 7
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international law provide an inappropriate basis in international law for the practise
and fuel the terrorist and political accusation that the United States intelligence
services act in a lawless and arbitrary fashion.

Second, since the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, it appears that the primary
practise has been for the purposes of interrogation and prevention, as opposed to
bringing individuals to trial29, namely “extraordinary rendition.” This article shows
that this practise can be accommodated under the international wrong of “enforced
disappearances” and is not a novel concept. In addition, the threat or use of torture as
part of this interrogation removes any legitimacy that could attach to the process and
separates the individual from judicial scrutiny and the protection of the law. Evidence
has shown that trials of detainees have occurred in some post 9/11 instances before
the individual “reappeared.”30 This element of the practise can also be accommodated
under the pre-existing international crime of abduction.

We can conclude therefore that both “rendition to justice” and “extraordinary
rendition” bear little resemblance to the traditional use of the terms rendition or
extradition - the recognised, legal methods of transferring a suspect of a criminal
offence from one State to another. These practises are more appropriately
accommodated under pre-existing offences. It is clear from the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, the English House of Lords, and the Australian High
Court that forcible transfer from one State to another for the purposes of bringing a

29

Below the Radar, Section 1.4 Rendition Practise since September 2001

30

Below the Radar, Section 1.7 Secret detentions and secret transfers: the case of Muhammad

Bashmilah, Salah Qaru and Muhammad al-Assad
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suspect to trial has been recognised as the offence of abduction. This process best
describes the “rendition to justice” process and those “extraordinary renditions”
where an individual “reappeared.” The word ‘rendition” has been show to be of legal
definition prior to the practise at issue. The word “extraordinary” in this context “is
being stretched here to include more sinister meanings that your dictionary will not
provide: secret; ruthless; and extrajudicial.”31 The lack of trial resulting from the
“extraordinary rendition” process renders it fundamentally different to “rendition to
justice”. The phrase “extraordinary rendition” is therefore an inappropriate
description of the process in question. This article argues this difference compels one
to conclude that “extraordinary rendition” is in fact and in law an enforced
disappearance.

A number of advantages exist in recognising two distinct, pre-existing offences. The
development of a prohibition of abduction and enforced disappearance under
international customary law adds clarity to the international responsibility and human
rights obligations of offending States. In addition, the correct classification of this
practise under these offences would signify the inherent illegality of the acts in
question. Clarity in this area would facilitate a more open and co-operative
environment in the context of counter-terrorism, ensuring clearly defined limits to
counter-terrorism practise for both the United States and its allies. The delineation of
such limits would reverse the use of the term “extraordinary rendition” in the manner
applied by the U.S. intelligence community, which adds to the ambiguity surrounding

31

Salman Rushdie, “Ugly Phrase conceals an uglier truth” 10 January 2006 The Sydney Morning

Herald; http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/ugly-phrase-conceals-an-ugliertruth/2006/01/09/1136771496819.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
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the process and further distances the process from international scrutiny and
accountability. In addition, such limits would further curtail the possibility of
abductions by enemies of the United States and their allies in the War on Terror on
the principles of clarity of offences and reciprocity. It is now proposed to examine the
substantive content of the two offences, so as to emphasise the similarity of the
practises in question to the offences discussed.

3. Abduction32

Extradition has been described above as “the official surrender of an alleged criminal
by one state or nation to another having jurisdiction over the crime charged.”33. The
process of abduction has been used to circumvent the extradition procedure, as it
occurs without the consent of the host State. Abduction can be seen to be the forcible
transfer of an individual from one State to another without the knowledge or consent
of the host State. Abduction is a crime of long and infamous history, yet not one
explicitly prohibited by international instruments. Abduction has been employed as a
method of acquiring jurisdiction in a number of scenarios. First, abduction has been
used where the extradition agreement would have prevented the requested transfer34.
Second, abduction has been used where there has been no extradition agreement in
place between States35. Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, some
States have used abduction as a method of extending jurisdiction and obtaining
32

See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, International extradition: United States law and practice (Dobbs

Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 2002.)
33

Black’s Law Dictionary 605 (7th ed. 1999)

34

United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990)

35

R v. Horseferry, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)

Page 13 of 44

custody, in response to international terrorism and crime36, despite the presence of
existing extradition agreements. “Renditions to justice” can be seen to fall within this
later category for the reasons outlined above. While “renditions to justice” pursue a
valid and important counter-terrorism objective discussed below, the process violates
international law as a form of abduction.

Abduction breaches international law in various ways. First, by not seeking or
requiring the consent or knowledge of the host State, abductions constitute forcible
action on the territory of another State. This breaches the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State37 from which the individual was abducted, in addition to the
obligation of non-interference in the internal affairs of another State.38 The Permanent
Court of Justice in The Lotus case stated “the first and foremost restriction imposed
by international law upon a State: … that failing the existence of a permissive rule to
the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another
State.”39 It is suggested that the international law violation is of fundamental
importance, and weighs heavily against the counter-terrorism objectives pursued.

Second, a number of individual human rights violations can be demonstrated in the
case of abduction. The extradition process is designed to protect the rights of accused
person by procedural safeguards and principled restrictions to the extraditable

36

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 494 U.S. 259 (1990)

37

U.N. Charter, art. 2 para. 4

38

U.N. Charter, art. 2 para. 7

39

The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey) PCIJ, Ser. A., No. 10, 1927, at page 18
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offences. In particular, an exception exists for political offences, which are
extraditable at the discretion of the host State. This maintains the sovereignty of the
host State and emphasises extradition as an expression of that sovereignty. Abduction
disregards the safeguards and restrictions and infringes the rights of the abducted
person without legal warrant. Therefore the liberty, security of person, and freedom of
movement are among the rights violated by abduction.40 These violations would be
avoided by the use of the extradition process, the use of which would not be contrary
to the pursuit of terrorism. In addition, renewed use of the extradition process would
strengthen international relations in the counter-terrorist context.

Third and related to the benefits of use of extradition, abductions constitute a
disruption of world public order.41 By ignoring pre-existing extradition agreements
and acting without the consent of the host State, the practise of abductions
undermines the rule of law and disrupts the trust and comity between States. In the
context of the War on Terrorism, unilateral abduction such as “rendition to justice”
has a deleterious effect on the legitimacy of counter-terrorist actions as well as the
sustainability of regional alliances and dialogue with affected and hostile States. As
will be discussed below, unfettered executive counter-terrorist action is not and
should not be removed from judicial scrutiny and this lack of legitimacy and
disruption to the comity between courts can be remedied through the judicial
process.42

40

41

42

ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, at 62
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra, 252
ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, 76
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The illegality of abductions for the purposes of bringing an individual to trial in the
abducting State was confirmed in the abduction of Adolf Eichmann, who was
abducted from Argentina by agents of the Israeli State. In response to the abduction,
the UN Security Council issued a Resolution43, condemning the practise and warning
that such actions “may, if repeated, endanger international peace and security.” Such
language suggests that if the practise was repeated it could provoke the use of
Security Council powers under Articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter. Therefore we
can conclude that even despite imperative policy objectives and absolute prohibitions
of competing offences, such as genocide, abduction continues to constitute a violation
of international law and the human rights of the abducted person. In particular,
extradition exists as an expression of State sovereignty; the decision to extradite the
individual remains at the discretion of the host State. In the absence of an extradition
agreement, the host State is under no obligation to extradite. Abductions can be seen
to override such discretion.

This Article proposes that even in counter-terrorist and wartime scenarios, abduction
is an inappropriate and illegal measure. The case of S. v. Ebrahim44 is used to show
that even in extreme political or military situations, it is open and incumbent upon the
judiciary to maintain the rule of law and deny jurisdiction to cases resultant from
abductions. In the pursuit of terrorists, this Article therefore concludes that an
approach must be adopted, which accords with international law and fosters cooperation and diplomacy between States.

43

U.N. S.C. Res. 138 U.N. Doc. S/4349 (22 June, 1960)

44

State v. Ebrahim 1991 (2) S.A. 553 (a); 31 I.L.M. 888 (1992)
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Two distinct schools of thought have emerged as to how best to deal with cases where
the individual is produced before a court from a foreign State by means of abduction.
The so-called “Ker-Frisbie” doctrine prevalent in the United States does not preclude
a court from exercising its jurisdiction where the accused has been brought before the
court by means of abduction from a foreign jurisdiction. While this position accords
with the “renditions to justice” process, it will be shown that this doctrine is
inappropriate in the case of international abductions and fails to appreciate the
international law and human rights obligations of the United States.

In contrast, an exclusionary doctrine as applied in S. v. Ebrahim has been favoured in
other common law jurisdictions. It will be shown that the courts in these jurisdictions
invoke the supervisory jurisdiction inherent in all common law courts to prevent
abuse of process and executive lawlessness. It will be argued that this position best
protects the abducted individual respects State sovereignty, and maintains
international order and comity. It is argued that the exclusionary doctrine is the
appropriate approach in the case of “renditions to justice”, as this best protects human
rights and strengthens the importance of co-operation in counter-terrorist activities.

a. The Exclusionary Doctrine45

The exclusionary view of abduction recognises both the inter-State international law
violation and the human rights violation suffered by the abducted person. The courts

45

See Stephan Wilske and Teresa Schiller Jurisdiction Over Persons Abducted in Violation of

International Law in the Aftermath of United States v Alvarez-Machain 5 U Chi L Sch Roundtable
205, 219-229 for an extensive survey of State practise
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that have recognised these violations invoke a supervisory power inherent in common
law courts and deny the jurisdiction of the said court to hear a case where the accused
has been procured by abduction. In doing so, it can be seen that the courts place a
high value on the rule of law and the maintenance of judicial integrity. This position
can be reconciled with the pursuit of terrorism and can be seen to be consistent with
the limited judicial intervention in present U.S. counter-terrorism jurisprudence, noted
below.

In S v. Ebrahim46, the appellant was a member of the military wing of the African
National Congress. He was abducted from Swaziland and brought into the Republic
of South Africa, where he was charged with treason. The appellant argued that the
abduction was contrary to international law, and thus deprived the court of
jurisdiction. Steyn J. accepted this argument, holding that the South African court had
no jurisdiction to try a person abducted by agents of the State from another State. The
Court concluded that the abductors were very likely to be agents of the South African
State.47 In addition, Steyn J. took account of the “conduct of modern state affairs”
which required delegation of decision-making to lower levels. The Court stated:

When action is authorised and executed at such a lower level, the state is involved
and responsible for the consequences, even if such action is not permitted by the
highest state authority. This applies also to the conduct of the security agencies of

46

State v Ebrahim 1991 (2) SA 553 (a); 31 ILM 888 (1992)

47

Agents were defined for this purpose as “persons acting under the authority of some State agency”.
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the administration. The abduction of the appellant was clearly the work of one or
other of these agencies, excluding the police.48

This statement is an important recognition of State liability in light of any defence of
plausible deniability on the part of the State executive. After examining Roman,
Roman-Dutch, and South African law, the Court recognised the multiple issues and
legal principles affected by an abduction, stating:

When the State is a party to a dispute, as for example in criminal cases, it must
come to court with “clean hands”. When the State itself is involved in an
abduction across international borders, as in the present case, its hands are not
clean.49

The decision in S v. Ebrahim is welcome in the context of “renditions to justice” for a
number of reasons. First, the decision recognises abduction as an international wrong,
and confirms the ability of the Court to rule upon such conduct. Similarly, limited
judicial intervention is affirmed in the case of military and political matters regarding
inter-State renditions. Third, international law is cited in conjunction with domestic
law to conclude that the South African Court should deny itself jurisdiction in the
case.

48

Ebrahim 35 ILM 888 (1992), at 891

49

Id., at 896
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R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, ex parte Bennett50 contains the most recent
and authoritative statement on the exclusionary doctrine for international abductions.
In confirming the approach taken in S. v. Ebrahim, the House of Lords gave its
considerable weight and authority to the exclusionary doctrine. The importance of this
decision must be read in light of Britain’s key position in the War on Terrorism.

The appellant was a citizen of New Zealand alleged to have committed fraud offences
in the United Kingdom in 1989. English authorities tracked the appellant to South
Africa. There was no pre-existing extradition agreement between the United Kingdom
and South Africa.51 The appellant alleged that, as a result of collusion between UK
and South African police forces, he had been abducted from the Republic of South
Africa to England.52 It was alleged that the transfer occurred in defiance of an order of
the Supreme Court of South Africa. The Divisional Court held that it had no power to
inquire into the circumstances in which the applicant was brought within the
jurisdiction.53

50

Regina v. Horseferry Street Magistrates, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42

51

Special extradition agreements are available under section 15 of the UK Extradition Act, 1989. No

extradition proceedings were initiated in this case.
52

The House of Lords did not enquire into the truth of these allegations, but rather it was assumed that

the English police took a deliberate decision not to pursue extradition procedures but to persuade the
South African police to arrest and forcibly return the appellant to this country, under the pretext of
deporting him to New Zealand via Heathrow so that he could be arrested at Heathrow and tried for the
offences of dishonesty he was alleged to have committed in 1989.
53

The Court was presented with two conflicting lines of jurisprudence. In denying jurisdiction, the

Divisional Court relied on a number of precedents relied upon in Ker v Illinois.
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On appeal, the House of Lords held where a defendant has been forcibly brought to
the United Kingdom, in disregard of available extradition procedures and in breach of
international law, the English courts should take cognisance of those circumstances
and refuse to try the defendant. The English courts thus had the power to enquire into
the circumstances by which a defendant arrives in the jurisdiction. The court reviewed
the conflicting earlier authority. A early line of cases including Ex parte Scott54,
which supported the proposition that the role of the court was confined to the forensic
process of the case before it and could not enquire into the legality or otherwise of
police conduct prior to the case. A more recent line of cases55 was of the opinion that
the English courts maintained a supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of the
executive. His Lordship recognised that a choice existed based both these lines of
English precedence and on existing case law of other States. It is instructive to quote
the speech at length:

If the court is to have the power to interfere with the prosecution in the present
circumstances it must be because the judiciary accept a responsibility for the
maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a willingness to oversee
executive action and to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either
basic human rights or the rule of law.

My Lords, I have no doubt that the judiciary should accept this responsibility
in the field of criminal law. The great growth of administrative law during the
latter half of this century has occurred because of the recognition by the
judiciary and Parliament alike that it is the function of the High Court to
54

55

Ex parte Scott 9 Barn. & C. 446 (1829); Relied upon by the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
See in particular Regina v. Bow Street Magistrates, ex parte Mackeson (1981) 75 Cr. App. R. 24
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ensure that executive action is exercised responsibly and as Parliament
intended. So also should it be in the field of criminal law and if it comes to the
attention of the court that there has been a serious abuse of power it should, in
my view, express its disapproval by refusing to act upon it.56

Lord Bridge concurred, stating that:

To hold that the court may turn a blind eye to executive lawlessness beyond
the frontiers of its own jurisdiction is, to my mind, an insular and unacceptable
view. Having then taken congnisance of the lawlessness it would again appear
to me to be a wholly inadequate response for the court to hold that the only
remedy lies in civil proceedings at the suit of the defendant or in disciplinary
or criminal proceedings against the individual officers of the law enforcement
agency who were concerned in the illegal action taken.57

Both Lord Griffiths and Lord Lowry quote Lord Devlin in Connelly v Director of
Public Prosecutions58 to the effect that “the courts cannot contemplate for a moment
the transference to the executive of the responsibility for seeing that the process of
law is not abused.”59
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ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, 62
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ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, 67
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Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] A.C. 1254

59

Connelly [1964] A.C. 1254, 1354
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The decision in ex parte Bennett is to be welcomed for a number of reasons. First, the
Court recognises the supervisory jurisdiction of all common law courts. In doing so,
the House of Lords emphasised the importance of the rule of law above the desire to
pursue criminals. This principled approach echoes the approach taken in the
exclusionary rules of evidence and commands application to the area of counterterrorism. It is suggested that the importance of the rule of law is pronounced in
counter-terrorism situations, given the extent of potential human rights violations
present in “rendition to justice” and “extraordinary rendition” processes.

Second, the courts upheld the illegality of abductions even where the host State has
conspired with the forum State to bring about such an abduction. This can be seen to
be an expansive interpretation of the illegality of abductions and is to be welcomed.
This position recognises the importance of transparency and accountability in matters
of extradition, and is of immediate application to counter-terrorism where effective
action through international co-operation can only be fostered through open dialogue
and clear process and procedure.

Third, and related to the first point, the House of Lords recognised that executive
power in matters of foreign affairs, including extradition, is not to be unfettered. To
deny jurisdiction to challenge the legality of executive action and detention in cases of
abduction would be akin to removing the ancient common law right of habeas corpus;
to do so would be to grant the executive unnecessarily broad powers in these areas;
this would be at odds with judicial intervention and recognition of international law
principles such as non-refoulement. Indeed, the protections of an extradition Treaty
and the rights it affords an accused can be seen as inherent justiciable. The use of the
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extradition process is an expression of State sovereignty, yet the guiding principles of
double criminality and specialty ensure that the rights of the transferred person are
also subject to protection and judicial scrutiny.

b. The “Ker-Frisbie” Doctrine

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that there is no bar to prosecution
where a defendant was abducted from a foreign country and brought to the U.S. for
trial. In doing so, the Court has granted a sizeable degree of deference to Presidential
and executive power in matters of foreign affairs and national security. This Article
shows that the Court has arrived at this position by the use of inconsistent judicial
reasoning and a failure to accept the responsibility to oversee executive action.

In Ker v. Illinois60 the defendant was abducted by a non-State, private agent from
Lima, Peru to face charges of fraud in Illinois. The Supreme Court relied upon earlier
decisions61 as authority for the proposition that abduction was an insufficient ground
and invalid objection and did not preclude the Court from trying the defendant.62 It is
important to note the lack of direct State action in the abduction in this case and the
lack of protest by the Peruvian State.

60

Ker v. Illinois 119 U.S. 436 (1886)

61

Ex parte Scott, 9 Barn. & C. 446, (1829); Lopez & Sattler's Case, 1 Dearsl. & B. Cr. Cas. 525; State

v. Smith, 1 Bailey, 283, (1829;) State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, (1835;) Dow's Case, 18 Pa. St. 37, (1851;)
State v. Ross, 21 Iowa, 467, (1866;) The Richmond v. U. S., 9 Cranch, 102
62

Ker 119 U.S, at 444
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The decision in Ker was upheld in Frisbie v. Collins63, where the respondent was
charged and convicted of murder. While the respondent was living in Chicago,
Michigan officers forcibly seized and transported him to Michigan. Black J stated of
the decision in Ker and subsequent cases:

No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of
cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when
one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of
the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional
procedural safeguards.64

In United States v. Alvarez-Machain65 the Ker-Frisbie doctrine was applied to an
international abduction, despite the protest of the host State. The decision is of great
importance to our study of this limb of the “extraordinary rendition” process and
“renditions to justice”, as it demonstrates inter alia the extent of U.S. judicial
deference to the executive. Such deference in matters of foreign affairs is pronounced
where coupled with issues of national security and counter-terrorism, matters within
executive purview of necessity. This Article argues that despite traditional deference,
it is open to the Court to extend a limited set of constitutional rights to all in the
custody of U.S. intelligence agents.

63

Frisbie v. Collins 342 U.S. 519, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952)

64

Frisbie 342 U.S. at 522

65

United States v. Alvarez-Machain 504 U.S. 655 (1992)
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The defendant was a Mexican citizen accused of participation in the murder of an
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (“D.E.A.”). Other D.E.A.
governmental agents were found responsible for the abduction the defendant from
Mexico66, despite an extradition treaty between the two States67. The United States
did not inquire whether Mexico would extradite the defendant, nor did they afford the
Mexican State an opportunity to try the defendant in Mexican courts. The District
Court and Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit both held that the court lacked jurisdiction
to hear the case as the abduction violated the extradition treaty, but the Supreme Court
reversed this decision on appeal.

The Supreme Court began by noting that while the matter was a case of first
impression, the Court had ruled on the effect of a violation of an extradition Treaty in
United States v. Rauscher68, where the Court implied a term of specialty to an
extradition treaty on the basis of the practise of States. The Supreme Court then noted
that the decision in Ker had been distinguished from Rauscher as the applicant had
not been returned to the United States by virtue of the extradition treaty. The Court
acknowledged the differences between Ker and the present case, in particular the lack
of governmental involvement in Ker and the lack of objection from the government of
Peru,69 but did not find them sufficient to distinguish the case. It is clear that the facts
of the case are not directly analogous with those of either Ker or Frisbie. In Ker a
private individual abducted the applicant – not a State agent. In addition, in Ker the
66

See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602-604, 609 (CD Cal. 1990)

67

Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, 1979. United States-United Mexican States, 31 U.S.T. 5059,

T.I.A.S. No. 9656 (Extradition Treaty or Treaty)
68

United States v. Rauscher 119 U.S. 407 (1886)

69

Alvarez-Machain 504 U.S. at 662
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host State Peru did not lodge a formal complaint. In Frisbie the abducted occurred in
a domestic context and therefore did not involve the issue of State sovereignty that
arose in Alvarez-Machain. In Alvarez-Machain the involvement of State agents was
acknowledged. It is suggested that this distinction brings the facts of the case closer to
those of Rauscher and therefore involves and invokes the extradition treaty, and that
the latter should be the relevant and binding case.

In addition to the factual differences overlooked by the majority decision, the dissent
noted a critical flaw in majority reasoning. Stevens J. notes that by overlooking this
distinction, the Court was able to distinguish Rauscher in a fashion that compelled it
to apply the Ker-Frisbie doctrine inappropriately. Stevens J. stated:

[A]t the outset of its opinion, the Court states the issue as "whether a criminal
defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an
extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this
country's courts." Ante, at 1. That, of course, is the question decided in Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); it is not, however, the question presented for
decision today.70

The requirement of State action had also been noted in Cook v. United States71, which
concerned the seizure of a British vessel outside the jurisdiction of the United States,
which was found to contain alcoholic beverages during the prohibition era. The Court
held that the seizure was not authorised by the relevant Treaty as it had occurred

70

Alvarez-Machain 504 U.S. at 682

71

Cook v. United States 288 U.S. 102 (1933)
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outside the provided distance for boarding rights. The Court, in refuting the
applicability of Ker v. Illinois, stated:

The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made
by one upon whom the Government had not conferred authority to seize at the
place where the seizure was made. The objection is that the Government itself
lacked power to seize, since by the Treaty it had imposed a territorial
limitation upon its own authority.72

This Article therefore concludes that the Supreme Court began in error by stating that
the primary issue before the court was whether the abduction of the respondent
violated the Extradition Treaty. If the Court found that it did not, the rule in KerFrisbie applied. This difficulty is to be regretted. The Court began by noting the
absence of an explicit prohibition on abduction in the terms of the treaty. The Court
referred to Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty, noting that neither State was required
to extradite its nationals73, but rather the Treaty imposed a duty on the host State to
extradite or prosecute individuals sought for extradition.74 The respondent had argued
that “all the processes and restrictions on the obligations to extradite established by
the Treaty would make no sense if either nation were free to resort to forcible
kidnapping to gain the presence of the individual for prosecution…”75 The Supreme
Court was of the opinion however that Article 9 did not provide the exclusive means

72

Cook 288 U.S. at 121

73

Extradition Treaty, art. 9 para. 1

74

Extradition Treaty, art. 9, para. 2

75

Alvarez-Machain 504 U.S. at 664
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of gaining custody of a national of the host State76, finding that the history of
negotiation and practise of the treaty did not support a prohibition on abduction.

If the transfer of individuals is not required outside the terms of the treaty, then it
remains at the discretion of the host State. The host and forum States vested their
intention and discretion in the extradition treaty. Therefore transfer that occurs outside
the terms of the treaty or without the general consent of the host State overrides that
discretion. It can therefore be said to violate the terms of the treaty, an expression of
that sovereign discretion. By concluding that the treaty did not set out the exclusive
means of transfer, it was open to the Court to conclude that abduction was not
prohibited. It is urged that this interpretation was not open to the court.

The court then turned to the question of whether the treaty should have a term implied
to prohibit forcible abduction. The Court had difficulty with the nature of implied
term sought.77 It concluded that the prohibition sought was too broad for the purposes
of the extradition treaty. Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished the violation of an
implied term of extradition treaty in Rauscher78 from the present case. In former case,
a term of specialty was implied owing to the practice of nations with regard to
extradition treaties. The Chief Justice concluded that to imply a prohibition of
abduction in the present case would derive from “principles of international law more
generally”79 and that such an implication was beyond the authority of precedent and
76

Id.

77

The respondent had sought suggest that the Extradition Treaty should prohibit one government

exercising “ its police power in the territory of another State’
78

Alvarez-Machain 504 U.S. at 668
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Id.
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practice. The decision in Rauscher was described as “a small step to take”80 and
contrasted with “much larger inferential leap”81 required in the present case.

Chief Justice Rehnquist came to the conclusion that the term sought to be implied was
“general” in nature, in particular the violation of State sovereignty was too broad a
concept to be prohibited under the extradition treaty. The Court distinguished the term
implied in Rauscher as relating to the "practise of nations with regard to extradition
treaties.”

In Rauscher the term of specialty implied has developed to be a general principle
governing the area of extradition. The Court in that case examined State practise and
the writings of learned scholars relating to extradition.82 In the present case, an
equally appropriate nexus can be seen. It has been shown above that the term
rendition applies to all forms of transfer of an individual from one State to another for
the purposes of trial. Therefore it can be said to apply to both abduction and
extradition. The Court had stated that its interpretation of the treaty was to be akin to
that of a statute. A general principle of interpretation of statutes can be found in the
Latin maxim expressio unius, exclusio alterius. It can thus be argued that by including
terms for a method of extradition as the preferred form of rendition of individuals, the
United States and Mexican Governments could not have intended to include
alternative forms of rendition. Therefore even on the required nexus to the practise of

80

Id, at 669

81

Id.

82

Rauscher 119 U.S. at 412-419
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states related to extradition set out by Chief Justice Rehnquist83 an implied term
prohibiting abduction is permissible, as the converse to any freedom to abduct.

In addition, it is suggested that the Supreme Court erred in distinguishing United
States v. Rauscher. There the Court had regard to the practise of nations, limited to
extradition treaties, to imply a term of specialty. In Rauscher regard was had not only
to the explicit terms of the treaty, but to the need to maintain the purpose and spirit of
the treaty as well.84 The narrow reading of the implied term in Rauscher in AlvarezMachain is difficult to reconcile with the tenor of the former judgment, and with the
broad interpretation given to Ker v. Illinois, in particular, the manner in which the
factual differences were overlooked and its application to a case where an extradition
treaty was present. It therefore appears as if the Supreme Court employed, to some
extent, inconsistent forms of judicial reasoning. An initial narrow interpretation of
Rauscher cannot be reconciled with the broad application of Ker-Frisbie.85

The Court acknowledged that the abduction was “shocking” and may be in violation
of international law86, but concluded that it was not in violation of the Extradition
Treaty and that therefore the Ker-Frisbie rule applied. Justices Stevens, Blackmun,
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Alvarez-Machain 504 U.S. at 669
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Rauscher 119 U.S. at 422
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and O’Connor dissented; taking the view that to allow abduction despite the presence
of an extradition treaty would transform the latter into “little more than verbiage”.87
The dissent continued by stating that the detailed provisions of an extradition treaty
“would serve little purpose if the requesting country could simply kidnap the
person”88. This Article argues that the view of the dissent is to be preferred. It appears
from the decision of Chief Justice Rehnquist that the Supreme Court failed to consider
a general supervisory jurisdiction of the court in this matter. In recognising the
abduction as “shocking”, it is argued that the Court erred in failing to recognise a
resultant duty to deny jurisdiction to hear the case, as adopted in ex parte Bennett
above.

It is suggested that there is no inconsistency in principle between the approach
employed by the House of Lords and the decision in S. v. Ebrahim and the traditional
deference employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in matters of foreign affairs and
national security. Judicial intervention in denial of jurisdiction constitutes a limited
interference with executive power and is not unknown to U.S. jurisprudence. Limited
judicial intervention in the War on Terrorism was recognised in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld89
discussed in section five below. A supervisory jurisdiction has been previously
outlined in United States v. Hastings90 where it was held that such a jurisdiction could
be exercised in three instances:

87

504 U.S. 655, 673
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Id.

89

Hamdi et al v. Rumsfeld et al 542 U.S. 507 (2004)

90
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(i)

To implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights

(ii)

To preserve judicial integrity

(iii)

To provide a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct.91

It is clear that the facts of Alvarez-Machain would satisfy each of these criteria
independently. Either a refusal to hear the case or repatriation is both appropriate
remedies for the violation of territorial sovereignty and treaty violations. Similarly
such remedies would serve to preserve judicial integrity against executive lawlessness
and maintain the rule of law.

The decision in Alvarez-Machain was greeted with hostility by academics92, foreign
governments93 and international organizations94. It can be seen that the practice of
abduction in this context supports the short-term interests of the United States and can
be seen to be an effective, if arbitrary, method of obtaining the individuals sought.
However the practice could have the effect of weakening regional interests in the fight
against terrorism and certainly has the effect of weakening the promotion of human
rights and the spread of democracy. The “renditions to justice” process has been
shown to be more accurately categorised as abductions. While the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognised the illegality of these actions at international law, the Court
91
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92
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remains unwilling to counteract such illegality on a domestic level. This Article has
confirmed the inherent illegality of abductions and “renditions to justice” at
international law, and has urged the United States Supreme Court to adopt the
responsibility taken on by their British counterparts, preserve the rule of law and
stand as a barrier to executive lawlessness. It has been shown above that to adopt this
position would not be to the detriment of counter-terrorist objectives, but would rather
support long term goals.

4. Enforced Disappearances95

Since the declaration of the War on Terrorism, evidence has shown that
“extraordinary rendition” has pursued an alternative goal than rendering foreign
terrorist suspects to the United States to stand trial in a U.S. court. In conjunction with
the policy of indefinite detention without trial used for members of Al-Qaeda in
Guantanamo Bay, the “extraordinary rendition” process has been used to transport
suspects to undisclosed and unacknowledged locations outside of the U.S. for the
purposes of interrogation. This process includes transferring such suspects to foreign
governments such as Egypt or transporting the suspects to secretive locations known
as “black sites”96, operated by the C.I.A. In both locations, reports have indicated that
torture is commonplace during the interrogation process. This Article shows that this
process constitutes the international offence of “enforced disappearance.”
95

See generally Report submitted by Mr. Manfred Nowak, independent expert charged with examining

the existing international criminal and human rights framework for the protection of persons from
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The practise of enforced disappearances has been seen in the cases of Nazi
Germany97, in the Indian Punjab98 and the infamous use in the Soviet Union as part of
the “Great Purge”99. There is no specific human right not to be subjected to enforced
disappearances, but rather the practise is considered a multiple human rights violation.
Nowak considers that while the practise can be effectively prohibited by domestic and
international criminal legislation and facilitated by universal jurisdiction, gaps remain
in the prevention of the practise.100
Enforced disappearances have been variously defined in the recent past101. The
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from
Enforced Disappearance102 in 1992, which defined enforced disappearances as when:
Persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived
of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, …
followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned
97

Measures for enforced disappearances were adopted by the Nacht und Nebel Erlass (Night and Fog

Decree) of 7 December 1941
98
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or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such
persons outside the protection of the law.103

It is clear that the distinguishing characteristic of enforced disappearances is manner
in which “disappeared” persons are separated from the outside world and any legal
protected or oversight. Indeed, Human Rights Watch suggests104 that each of the
recent definitions involves four elements:
(a) Deprivation of liberty against the will of the detainee;
(b) Direct or indirect involvement of government officials;
(c) Refusal to acknowledge the detention or to disclose the fate and
whereabouts of the person concerned; and
(d) The removal of the detainee from the protection of the law.
It is clear from the “Below the Radar” report that the “extraordinary rendition”
process conforms to these criteria. It is clear that enforced disappearances violate a
variety of human rights, including the right to life, the right to liberty and security of
the person, the right not to be subjected to torture and the right to recognition as a
person before the law. This Article suggests that the pervasive nature of rights
violations caused by this practise outweighs the immediate counter-terrorism
objective. In addition, by developing a status as a violator of human rights, the United
States contributes to the vindication of the sentiment espoused by enemy

103

Id.
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organisations such as Al-Qaeda.
It is clear that the nature of enforced disappearances is such as to attempt to avoid any
legal process and human rights protection. In addition, it is noted that official denial
of this practise as part of counter-terrorist policy and a lack of judicial oversight
contribute to the view that U.S. intelligence agencies are aware of the illegality of the
practise at international law. Nevertheless, two parallel instruments outline a detailed
prohibition of enforced disappearances. First, the United Nations Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, 1992 contains the definition
quoted above, and recognises the multiple human rights violations that occur in the
case of enforced disappearances.105 The Declaration obliges States to take positive
action106 under domestic law to prevent the practise. It must be recognised that the
Declaration is soft law and is as such not legally binding. It is however important in a
broader context to establishing opinio juris to form a customary prohibition of
enforced disappearances. Second, the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearances, 1994107 provides support in treaty law for the prohibition of enforced
disappearances and is a legally binding instrument. The process is categorised as a
crime against humanity108 and similarly obliges Contracting States to enact measures
against and establish jurisdiction over crimes of enforced disappearance.109
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A full discussion of case law on the issue is beyond the scope of this article110. It is
proposed to examine the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as the most
developed in the area of enforced disappearances. In addition, this Article notes the
relevance of this case law for the Council of Europe Member States affected by the
extraordinary rendition process by the transfer of individuals through their territory by
U.S. intelligence agencies. It must first be recognised that the prohibition of enforced
disappearances is an unenumerated right of the European Convention on Human
Rights, drawn from a number of explicit provisions.111 In Kurt v. Turkey112, Uzeyir
Kurt was arrested by Turkish security forces and disappeared while in their custody.
His mother submitted an application the Strasbourg court on her own behalf and on
behalf of her son. The Court found that Article 5 had been violated in the case of
Uzeyir Kurt and in addition that Article 3 had been violated in the case of the
applicant.113 Turkey also violated Article 13 by reason of lack of a meaningful
investigation into the disappearance.114
In Cyprus v. Turkey115, Cyprus claimed, “about 1,491 Greek-Cypriots were still

difficult path from clarifying past cases to effectively preventing future ones 1996 E.H.R.L.R. 348, at
352
110
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missing 20 years after the cessation of hostilities, these people were last seen alive in
Turkish custody and their fate has never been accounted for by the respondent
State.”116 As is often necessary in such cases, the Commission proceeded not on the
basis of ascertaining the whereabouts of the missing persons, but rather to determine
“whether or not the alleged failure of the respondent State to clarify the facts
surrounding the disappearances constituted a continuing violation of the
Convention.”117 The Grand Chamber found that there had been such a violation under
Article 2 of the Convention, citing a failure to conduct an effective investigation.
However, in the absence of evidence to suggest that such missing persons were killed
in a manner, which engaged the State’s liability, the Court concluded that there was
no violation of Article 2 in that respect. This case is of relevance given the military
nature of the conflict in question, which is analogous to the “War on Terrorism”. It is
clear from this decision that despite the presence of a military conflict, a prohibition
on enforced disappearances and a resultant obligation to effectively investigate claims
of the same persist.
Enforced disappearance has also been categorised as a crime against humanity as part
of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, subject to certain criteria.118 While
it is acknowledged that the United States is not a party to the International Criminal
Courts, it is also recognised that liability of third States may be engaged in
circumstances where individuals subjected to enforced disappearances are transported
through their territory and that the Statute is declaratory of customary international
116

Id., paragraph 20

117

Id., paragraph 22

118

Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7. Para. 2 (i), July 1, 2002, U.N. Doc. 2187 U.N.T.S.

90

Page 39 of 44

law in some instances. It is also apparent that a number of provisions of international
humanitarian law can be seen to protect the rights affected by enforced
disappearances.119 These provisions are of heightened significance under a War on
Terrorism justification.
The primary justification envisaged for the “extraordinary rendition” program is the
status and nature of the War on Terrorism itself. Traditionally, the American judiciary
has granted significant deference to the President in wartime, for decisions made in
his Commander-in-Chief function. Despite the international law and human rights
concerns detailed above, advocates argue that the courts cannot review the
Presidential power authorising the “extraordinary rendition” program, as such a
Commander-in-Chief decision. The difficulty with this position is evident from the
non-conventional nature of the War on Terrorism. Combating a series of urban terror
operations against a civilian terrorist organisation is in stark contrast to the initial
military campaign in Afghanistan, or the subsequent invasion of Iraq. While notable
deference has been given to the Commander-in-Chief in these instances and the
continuing detention of combatants in Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognised a limited set of justiciable rights, including the common law right of
habeas corpus in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld et al120. It is now urged that a similar, albeit
limited set of rights exist in the case of “extraordinary rendition”.
The decision in Hamdi characterises the purpose of detaining enemy combatants as
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being to prevent their return to the field of battle and taking up arms once again.121
This Article has shown above that the purpose of “extraordinary rendition” is
malleable; it is primarily for the purposes of interrogation, but has also been used as a
preventative measure in the case of “high-value” suspects. The Supreme Court in
Hamdi found no difficulty with such a principle; the difficulty arose in the case of
indefinite detention. The Court held that the above rationale lead to the conclusion
that “the litigation of this case suggests Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his
life.”122 It is clear that the same rationale would produce a similar result in the case of
“extraordinary renditions”. The difficulty with this result is heightened by the fact that
those subject to the “extraordinary rendition” process remain, primarily, suspected of
unspecified terrorist activity and offences. While the value of preventative detention
in this context is recognised, the arbitrary nature of this detention compels one to
conclude that judicial oversight is required to prevent a reoccurrence of the
unfortunate events of the El-Masri incident.123
The Court then outlines the limited nature of the rights involved. It is therefore argued
that despite the judicial deference to the War on Terrorism, the Supreme Court should
extend the minimum rights granted to those in detention as enemy combatants in
Guantanamo Bay to all those subject to indefinite detention under “extraordinary
rendition” and facilitate the right of habeas corpus. This proposal does not infringe
the Presidential power as Commander-in-Chief to a disproportionate degree; in this
regard, the considerations applied to granting enemy combatants this core of rights
applies equally to “extraordinary rendition” detainees.
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In conclusion, this Article emphasises that the United States Supreme Court has
refuted the possibility that the President has Congressional approval for indefinite
detention under the Authorisation for Use of Military Force (“the AUMF”). Justice
O’Connor stated, “Hamdi contends that the AUMF does not authorise indefinite or
perpetual detention. Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purposes of
interrogation is not authorised.”124 The practise of “extraordinary renditions” awaits
official acknowledgment and judicial ruling. It is hoped that the U.S. Supreme Court
will continue to recognise the significance of the rule of law in the War on Terrorism.
5. Conclusion

The new world order of post-Soviet politics has left one State with the status of
“superpower”, with the capacity and leadership to shape international law and policy
in a sweeping fashion. By reason of this status and other causes, the United States
above all other States has been the constant target of terrorist attacks and ideological
hatred. Its allies have also been subject to increasing terrorist attacks as part of a
broader ideological conflict. This Article began by recognising this radical and
unprecedented threat posed by terrorism in the twenty first century and the need for
an innovative and precise counter-terrorist response. While recognising the
developments required by the nature of terrorism, this Article has argued that there is
no justification in removing the safeguards guaranteed by due process of law or
human rights obligations. To suggest otherwise would lead, it is submitted, to
arbitrary and unprincipled choices, and give unchecked power to investigative and
executive agents.
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This Article has shown that the counter-terrorist responses of “renditions to justice”
and “extraordinary rendition” are unprincipled and inadequate to face the present
terrorist threat on a long-term strategic basis. The present responses fail to
accommodate respect for allies and other States and act in an isolationist and
unilateral fashion. This approach is ill suited to a more complex and innovative
response required as a result of the non-conventional nature of the War on Terrorism.
In addition, dramatic failure to respect human rights creates difficulties in subsequent
prosecutions of terrorists in U.S. courts, as difficulties continue with the alternative of
military tribunals.

It is suggested that a new approach is required, facilitating a global response to a
global threat. It is difficult to reconcile the present divergent approaches of the United
States and the United Kingdom faced with a common threat and subject to similar
attacks. It is proposed that a transparent, judicial and principled response to the
terrorist threat is required, involving the co-operation and diplomacy of all affected
States, to counteract the effect of terrorism on both domestic and international levels.
This Article has shown that the present approach is singularly inadequate to achieve
this result. To conclude, it is instructive to remember the famous words of Lord Atkin
in his celebrated dissent in Liversidge Appellant v. Sir John Anderson125:

In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may be
changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has always
been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for which on
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recent authority we are now fighting, that the judges are no respecters of
persons and stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments on
his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is justified in
law.126
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